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Abstract
Cyber attack has become a major concern over the past
few years. While the technical capability to attack has
declined, hacking tools - both simple and comprehensive
- are themselves evolving rapidly. Certain approaches are
necessary to protect a system from cyber threats. This
work engages with comprehensive penetration testing in
order to find vulnerabilities in the Windows Server and
exploit them. Some forms of method penetration test-
ing have been used in this experiment, including recon-
naissance probes, brute force attacks based on password
guessing, implanting malware to create a backdoor for
escalating privileges, and flooding the target. This exper-
iment was focused on gaining access in order to ascertain
the identities of hackers and thus better understand their
methods and performed penetration testing to evaluate
security flaws in the Windows Server, which is a famous
OS for web applications. It is expected that this work will
serve as a guideline for practitioners who want to prepare
and protect their systems before putting them online.
Keywords: Mitigation, penetration testing, vulnerabilities,
windows server
1 Introduction
A definition of hacking is presented by [9, 25]. These
sources also identify security violation trends in internet-
working and their effects. More illegal activities such as
hacktivism, hacking and exploiting weaknesses have been
described by [12, 16, 29] offer a different perspective by
highlighting the potential economic threats and impacts
of cyber attacks. A growing problem, hacking activities
combine easy to learn pentest with a variety of tools such
as those offered by C.E.H [11]. Moreover, they use both
simple and comprehensive tools (defined as ’Metasploit’),
as defined by [5, 21]. This reinforces the findings of previ-
ous work [14] which compares attack sophistication with
attacker skill knowledge.
Meanwhile, analysis by [6, 12, 18] highlights an explo-
sion of security threats in recent years such as Trojans,
viruses, worms, adware, spyware and DoS which are con-
tinuing to grow, multiply and evolve. According to [14]
indicate the technical capability to attack tended to de-
crease. On the other hand, hacking tools are getting more
effective and also increasingly available and accessible to
the public. Moreover, attackers are able to detect vulner-
abilities faster than security experts or vendors and can
cause time delays by patching in vulnerabilities.
Research conducted by [26, 27] found that Windows
Server has more serious vulnerabilities, as several of its
services and daemons are unsecured and open to ac-
cess. This lays open the possibility of exploitation. Ad-
ditionally [32] located vulnerabilities in the Apache and
IIS HTTP server on the Windows Server operating sys-
tem. [28] conducted an attack scenario on the Windows
Server.
In order to understand how to protect against and pre-
vent attacks, it is useful to understand from the attacker’s
perspective what methods they will use, what goals they
have and how they launch their attacks. This experi-
ment takes improvised actions to highlight several types
of attacks carried out such as: probes to obtain detailed
information, brute force for guessing passwords, gaining
privileges access and flooding the target to reduce the
availability of services.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 presents the related works. Section 3 presents
the taxonomy of the attack this experiment is concerned.
Section 4 describes experimental experiments. This sec-
tion deals with data collecting and an attack scenario in-
cluding scanning and exploitation for mitigating vulner-
ability. Finally, Section 5 offers a conclusion and sugges-
tions for future work.
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2 Related Works
Penetration testing has been described in different ways
since 1989 by [24]. New methods and approaches are con-
tinuously being expanded from year to year. In 2001, [7]
described certain steps needed to prevent threats and con-
vey the importance of understanding the mindset of an
attacker, as well as their methods and goals. In line with
that, [2] has suggested a methodology to ensure that the
penetration testing exercise is reliable, repeatable and re-
portable.
Analyses and predictions by [12, 18] indicate that
there has been an explosion of security threats in recent
years. This has been corroborated and previously pre-
dicted by [17, 19], which describe a future war based on
cyber attacks. More recently, [23] has predicted and anal-
ysed cyber attacks in the context of further security vio-
lation trends. Meanwhile, [10] has referred to Microsoft
warning users about the strengths of character passwords
such as: a combination of case sensitive letters and digits,
maximum-minimum password age, and minimum pass-
word length.
Furthermore, it seems that every bug can cause vul-
nerabilities which are existent and undocumented, of-
ten never being revealed, discovered or exploited. From
the attacker’s perspective, vulnerability is an opportu-
nity that can be exploited. A vulnerability database is a
collection of records containing technical descriptions of
vulnerabilities in computer systems. Common Vulnera-
bilities and Exposures (CVE) began in 1999 as a result of
the adoption of a common naming practice for describing
software vulnerabilities and including security tools and
services as well as on the fixed sites of commercial and
open source software package providers. We argue that
dependencies exist between scanning phases and informa-
tion holes from CVE vulnerability databases. This has
consequences for access.
Additionally, work by [13, 15, 20] describes the benefits
of CVE compatibility, integrating vulnerability services
and tools allowing more complete security provision and
more alert advisory services. Every month CVE MITRE
receives between 150 and 300 new announcement alert
and advisory submissions from ISS, Security Focus, Neo-
hapsis, and the National Infrastructure Protection Cen-
tre. Currently CVE identifies compatible enablement
data exchange between security products and provides
a baseline for evaluating coverage of tools and services.
There are thousands of information vulnerabilities within
the CVE database. Unfortunately, time is required to
make a patch release after exploitation has been found.
Consequently, there is usually a a time delay between an
exploitation identification and a patch and signature re-
lease. It can be argued that there are dependencies in the
results between the scanning stages [15] and information
vulnerabilities in the CVE database. This means that
the vulnerability could be a security flaw exploitable by
attackers.
In this experiment followed four dominant categories
of attack: Probes, Remote to Local (R2L), User to Root
(U2R) and DoS as widely used in the field of intrusion
detection/prevention system, with reference to [3, 4, 8,
31].
3 Experiments
The dataset employed in this study was Intrusion Threat
Detection Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (ITD UTM), as
shown in Figure 1, available in [30]. All attacks were
executed and infiltrated on ITD UTM. The network envi-
ronment is set up for exploitation using Windows Server
and two terminal clients running as attackers. They are
connected to 3COM Superstack II 100 Mb/s, as shown in
Figure 1.
3.1 Data Collecting and Procedures
Several steps must be taken to conduct these experiments.
This work is an improvement on some of the advice of-
fered by [22] and this research agrees with the argument
expressed by [1], particularly on these problems: (i) re-
cent trends and new methods of attack have been in-
volved, (ii) control and guideline steps for penetration,
and (iii) various methods of attack for penetration and
mitigation become comprehensive. In this experiment,
three weeks were spent collecting data and finding vul-
nerability within CVE and security communities. More-
over, five weeks was spent attempting penetration testing
on the victim. There are some differences in the results
obtained in the first and second data collection. The first
data were collected directly from the server, regardless of
the network broadcast. Conversely, the second data were
collected using the hub terminal which also captured the
broadcast network. Furthermore, this procedure was fol-
lowed in this section:
1) To distinguish between normal traffic and attack, the
attack was separated and divided into several stages
based on time, machine target and method of attack.
2) Machine 10.10.10.1 is a NAT Firewall server that
both allows and denies private traffic to and from
the internet.
3) TCPdump is used to sniff real traffic. It uses the lib-
cap library to capture packets and has the ability to
consider the properties of an ideal as a packet snif-
fer. TCPdump produced raw data (pcap files) during
experiments conducted via 10.10.10.30.
4) Machine 10.10.10.40 running on Snort IDS 2.8.5.2
(Build 121), PCRE ver 8.12. This is used to iden-
tify the threat as well as to compare attacks carried
out which can be recognised by snort signature.
5) Two machine attackers, 10.10.10.15 (called Hacker
XP) running on Windows XP SP3 and 10.10.10.20
based on Backtrack 4 (called Hacker BT) to pene-
trate Windows Server SP3 in 10.10.10.25.
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Figure 1: Topology of test bed environment
Meanwhile, in this experiment all attacks were exe-
cuted on ITD UTM. The attack scenario for penetration
is further illustrated below.
Step 1. Scanning
• Attackers probe the network 10.10.10.25 via
GFI Scanning, Nessus, N-Stealth and Nmap;
• Attackers port reconnaissance of HTTP services
via Nikto;
• Attackers find open port to potential penetra-
tion, 21 (FTP), 23 (Telnet), 80 (HTTP), 445
(SMB), 1433 (Microsoft SQL Server), 1026 (Re-
mote Server).
Step 2. Brute Force
• Attackers attempt password of FTP & Telnet
via brute-force tools;
• Attackers attempts to host 10.10.10.25 for
guessing password remote access via TSgrinder;
• Attackers attempt SQL Ping and Brute force
SQL Login;
• Attackers successfully find user authenticated of
FTP;
• Nessus confirms user access ”anonymous” en-
able and allowed in FTP;
• Attackers log in to the host via FTP Client.
Step 3. Gaining privileges
• Attackers try to escalate privilege to adminis-
trator level;
• Attackers attempt web attack via HTTP
and launch ”/.... access”, ”/ root access”,
”/etc/passwd”, ”/usr/bin/id”, ”/etc/shadow
access” via HTTP port 80;
• Attackers attempts XSS attack - Attackers sniff
the network via Cain Abel by utilising of ARP;
• Attackers launch man in the middle attack and
SMB Unicode;
• Attackers add user ”puma” password :
12345678 via console;
• Attackers add user ”mike” password : 12345678
via console;
• Attackers add user ”john” password : 12345678
via console;
• Attackers create directory /mkdir ”tools” in
10.10.10.25 via console;
• Attackers crack root level hashing password via
localhost;
• Attackers upload some files including Trojan to
the victim via FTP;
• Attackers successfully implant the netbus to cre-
ate backdoor via FTP;
• Attackers execute and enable netbus via remote
desktop, then implant keylogger.
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Figure 2: Attack scenario diagram
Step 4. DoS
• Hacker XP and Hacker BT send a large
number of ICMP packets repeatedly to flood
10.10.10.25;
• Attackers launch attack LAND via sending TCP
SYN;
• Attacker flood packets using forged source;
• Attackers flood traffic host victim via UDP to
slow down the response of the target.
3.2 Scanning
An attacker’s first steps need to obtain information about
the victim and its environment. They map the network
to determine the target, followed by scanning in order to
interrogate and reconnoitre the victim. The attacker tries
to map out the IP Address/subnet mask information and
operating system that is in use, what services daemons are
actively run and the kernel/services pack used. In other
words, the attacker tries to map out the infrastructure
and resources of the network.
In this stage, several tools and scenarios are used to
gather information, and findings known as vulnerabilities
are mixed and combined to achieve the expected results.
Some of the measures are adopted to enable these tools
to complement each other. Moreover, none of these tools
can provide all the detailed information. They have lim-
itations particularly in translating the feedback packet
from the target host. Some tools identify the open port
and the rest are closed.
As mentioned in Section 3.1’s attack scenario, some
open ports were found and used to scan data coming
from such ports. The success of this process depends on
the operating system and the application that is run on
the server. Some tools are used in Hacker BT running
Zenmap, Xprobe2, Nikto, HTTPrint, and Hping2. Mean-
while, the Hacker XP machine runs these tools: GFiLAN,
Legion, Nessus, N-Stealth, X-Scan, and LanSpy, which
is a comprehensive target and a slow mode of scanning.
This stage of attack depicted in Figure 2 produces visu-
alisation, as shown in Figure 3(a) and (b) below.
3.3 Vulnerability
This section presents vulnerabilities that arose during the
scanning stages. From a hacker’s perspective, searching
for any kind information that can be exploited from the
CVE database may identify vulnerabilities. It can be ar-
gued that there are dependencies between scanning and
information holes within a CVE vulnerability database
with respect to gaining access. The critical and medium
risk vulnerabilities are as follows:
1) CVE-2011-1267, CVE-2011-1268, CVE-2011-0476
confirm SMB Server-Client to allow remote code ex-
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Figure 3: (a) Overall scanning traffic, (b) overall traffic of penetration stages. (c) refers to handshaking traffic
attackers with victim in scanning stages and (d) shows penetration.
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ecution if an attacker sends a specially crafted SMB
response to a client-initiated SMB request.
2) CVE-2008-4250, RPC vulnerabilities allow remote
code execution. An attacker could exploit this vul-
nerability without authentication to find arbitrary
code & worm exploitations.
3) CVE-2006-5583 is vulnerable and can be exploited
with regard to buffer overflow SNMP, allowing a re-
mote attacker to execute arbitrary codes via a crafted
SNMP packet via exec code overflow.
4) CVE-2006-3439 confirms vulnerability from buffer
overflows. This attack allows remote attackers, in-
cluding anonymous users to execute an arbitrary
code via a crafted RPC message.
5) CVE-2006-0026 and CVE-2000-0071 is vulnerable to
IIS. This attack can allow local and possibly remote
attackers to execute arbitrary codes via crafted Ac-
tive Server Pages (ASP) and allows a remote attacker
to obtain the real pathname of a document.
6) CVE-2003-0352, CVE-2003-0003, Buffer overflow
in a certain DCOM interface for RPC allows
remote attackers to execute arbitrary codes
via a malformed message, as exploited by the
Blaster/MSblast/LovSAN and Nachi/Welchia
worms.
7) CVE-2011-1247, Path vulnerability from Microsoft
active accessibility enables local users to gain privi-
leges via a Trojan horse DLL in the current working
directory.
8) CVE-2011-0654, Buffer overflow in Active Directory
services. This attack allows remote attackers to exe-
cute arbitrary codes or cause a denial of service via
a malformed BROWSER ELECTION message.
3.4 Penetration Testing
The stages identified certain holes to be exploited from
previous stages and launched the attack, a so-called User-
to-Root (U2R) attack. This extends the user’s privilege
to administrator/root to obtain full authorization access.
The attacker can create the new user, implant the mal-
ware, create the backdoor and clean their track from the
log server. Normally, the attacker starts with accessing a
normal local user account then later exploits vulnerabil-
ity to privileges. Moreover, the attackers also launched
brute force for guessing the password, cracking the pass-
word, web injection and man in the middle attack.
This step is called the Remote-to-Local (R2L) attack.
Request packets were sent to a machine over a network
which then exploits machine’s vulnerability to illegally
gain local access as a user without privileges. In this
stage, the attacker focused on brute force in order to gain
access and escalate privileges. According to the scenario
presented in Section 3.1 and Figure 2 above, attackers dis-
covered multiple vulnerabilities. They successfully found
the legitimate users then created a new user, and success-
fully used a brute force FTP log-in resulting in the mal-
ware to successfully create a backdoor. Figure 2 shows
illustrated penetration of Windows, as follows:
1) Hacker BT and Hacker XP attempted to conduct
surveillance whereby the attacker tries to map out
of IP Address/subnet mask information, operating
system being used, and which services are running
in 10.10.10.25. In other words, these stages are
called probes or scanning to map out and recon-
noitre the victim’s network infrastructure. Nessus,
Nmap, Nstealth, Legion and GFILanGuard are used
to communicate with the data base server several
times to check available updates of existing vulner-
abilities. There are some potential vulnerabilities to
be exploited which are as follows:
PORT STATE SERVICE
21/tcp open ftp
23/tcp open telnet
80/tcp open http
111/tcp open rpcbind
161/udp open snmp
445/tcp open microsoft-ds
1027/tcp open IIS
1433/tcp open ms-sql-s
2) Specific techniques are used to escalate privilege, at-
tempt password one by one via guessing, theft, sniff-
ing and cracking the password direct to target. From
the attacker’s perspective, the challenge is to find
the legitimate user and implant the Trojan to cre-
ate a backdoor. The attackers must prepare a dictio-
nary/word list, accuracy in selecting the dictionary is
a must and cracking the password in time depends on
the length of the password’s characters. Otherwise, a
brute force password via user ”administrator” can be
successfully performed of FTP by Hydra and failed
attempt Telnet.
root@bt:∼# hydra -l administrator -P
passdict.txt 10.10.10.25 ftp
[DATA] 16 tasks, 1 servers, 26870 login tries
(l:1/p:26870), ∼1679 tries per task
[DATA] attacking service ftp on port 21
[21][ftp] host: 10.10.10.25 login:
administrator password: intrusion
Moreover, the attacker launched TSgrinder to guess
the password of the remote desktop. This failed and
the dsniff was launched to the sniff user and pass-
word in broadcast network. HTTP brute force was
used to guess the web directory. Meanwhile, the traf-
fic attempt of brute force is dominant, as shown in
Figure 3(a).
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3) The attacker launched powerful tools such as Metas-
ploit, Cain and Abel and Netcat to find the com-
mand prompt. They attempted to obtain privileges
and attack launches via the command prompt, which
freely creates a new user account and removes the
traces. In this step, after obtaining a valid user, the
attackers attempted to implant a Trojan to create
the backdoor. They successfully implanted the Net-
bus Trojan and executed the ”Abel” in an ARP poi-
son attack. New users ”puma”, ”mike” and ”john”
were created before the attackers attempted to crack
the administrator password via John the Ripper and
Rainbow.The attacker attempted an IIS attack via
buffer overflow and SQL injection to break into a sys-
tem. During that time, they tried to find the weak-
nesses and structure of the website via SQL injection
in order to ascertain certain information and the er-
ror page from HTTP server.
4) Finally, to reduce availability the attackers contin-
uously launched DoS attacks by flooding the ICMP
and UDP. They were successful; the system could not
respond and crashed after a few minutes. Repeated
requests meant that the target was unable to handle
the service and reduce the availability. The results of
this scenario are shown in Figure 3(b) below.
4 Experiment Results and Discus-
sion
Snort is used to identify and recognize threats from
data traffic. It produces lots of logs contained in ma-
chine 10.10.10.30 ”var/log/snort” directory. The scan-
ning stages produces 677,914 packets and snort identi-
fied 45,139 alerts among them as threats. Meanwhile,
in the penetration stage there were 33,865,687 packets
and 265,200 were identified by the existing signature as a
threat.
4.1 Attack Pattern
This section presented some sample attack patterns
(Probe, U2R, R2L and DoS) from the experiment. Ev-
ery alert was compiled via snort and pcap files. In this
case, the pcap file was extracted and revealed some fea-
tures such as: time stamp, source IP Address, destination
IP Address, Protocol, size of protocol, Flag of Protocol,
Total Length of packet and content of packet.
From observations that were made, specific character-
istics of line to line attacks from can be recognised from
the header and payload of packets. They have a unique
pattern which tends to iterate in a particular line. Some
characteristics of pattern are as follows:
1) Web scanning, especially HTTP and HTTPS recon-
naissance, has the following characteristics: (i) each
packet has a source and destination IP address and
port numbers are spoofed, (ii) connections are said
to be state and number of ports accessed by a single
source, (iii) TCP flags are used randomly during the
attack, (iv) packet size and packet length are changed
frequently.
2) Netbus have these characteristics: (i) computer vic-
tims or servers typically listen on specific ports wait-
ing for instructions from attackers, (ii) they use TCP
protocol and port address 12345 to communicate
and each message has a fixed-length header, (iii) the
variable-sized data section follows the header and its
size is specified in the message-size field of the header,
(iv) the flag is fixed to the computer victim during
the communication process.
3) Brute force of FTP: (i) this attack generates repeti-
tion response, particularly content of flags and pro-
tocol length, (ii) anonymous user login attempts will
occur, (iii) the port address and flags are fixed dur-
ing attack, (iii) data connection uses the well-know
port 20 at the server side and control connection is
established on port 21.
4) Scenario of NetBIOS NULL session attack tries to
attack enumeration user and getting administrator
level, it have characteristic: (i) Packet size, total
length and flags fixed with randomly generated on
Port 139 (NetBIOS Session Service) and Port 445
(Common Internet File System), (ii) The flag value
is fixed and dominate by NetBIOS protocol session,
(iii) Vulnerability in Port 445 is possible to launched
SMB or Common Internet File System (CIFS) at-
tack, (iv) The TCP protocol are fixed during attack
attempt, NetBios Session Services (NBSS) port 135,
Remote Procedure Call (RPC) port 137, NetBIOS
Name Service port 138 and NetBIOS Datagram Ser-
vice port 139.
5) The characteristics of man in the middle attacks are:
(i) the ARP packet lack flag and protocol length
value, (ii) the ARP broadcasts from the attacker to
all IP addresses in one subnetmask and without infor-
mation of port source and destination, (iii) NetBIOS
datagram fixed used port 138 and NetBIOS Name
Service port 137.
Meanwhile, the number of rows that were gener-
ated by snort due to repetition of the same informa-
tion were observed. This can be simplified by initialis-
ing the signature-id and priority. Each alert comprises of
signature-id, priority, source of IP Address, source port,
destination of IP Address, destination of port address,
timestamp, Time To Live, Type of Service, IP Length
and Datagram length.
4.2 Identify of Probe
In this phase, snort confirms that there are 4078 lines
identified as ”SCAN FIN” as shown in Figure 4 below
and Table 1 shows the total attempts at probe attacks.
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Figure 4: Probe stages
Figure 5: Root to Local (R2L)
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Table 1: The Number of Alert from Scanning stages
No Detected Alert Priority Total
1 SCAN FIN 2 4078
2 NETBIOS SMB repeated logon failure 1 453
3 WEBROOT DIRECTORY TRAVERSAL 3 433
4 WEB-MISC http directory traversal 2 142
5 NETBIOS SMB repeated logon failure 1 101
6 NETBIOS SMB-DS repeated logon failure 1 74
7 (portscan) TCP Portscan 2 49
8 ICMP Timestamp Reply 1 31
9 SQL ping attempt 3 17
10 ICMP Information Request 3 15
11 SCAN nmap XMAS 2 10
12 ICMP webtrends scanner 2 9
13 RPC portmap listing TCP 111 2 6
14 SCAN Amanda client version request 2 4
15 ICMP superscan echo 2 4
16 NETBIOS SMB-DS ADMIN$ unicode share access 3 4
17 NETBIOS SMB-DS D$ unicode share access 3 2
18 (portscan) TCP Portsweep 3 2
19 NETBIOS SMB-DS C$ share access 3 1
20 NETBIOS SMB-DS ADMIN$ share access 3 1
4.3 Identify R2L
Figure 5 shows one of the attacks as described in the 2nd
scenario above. This attack focuses on obtaining privi-
leges for the system. The attacker launched several meth-
ods to attempt to find the passwords for FTP and Tel-
net. Moreover, Figure 3(b) demonstrates that traffic of
brute force becomes very dominant. Meanwhile, Table 2
shows the number of alerts from this attack. The attack-
ers tried repeatedly to guess the password by using the
default user.
4.4 Identify U2R
The attackers just focused on how to gain escalating priv-
ileges via level ”administrator/root”. They succeeded in
creating some new users with administrator level, im-
planting the malware and finding the backdoor. Figure 6
shows a sample from this attack and how the attackers
got into the system via an ”anonymous” user, then at-
tempts privileges infiltration via change working directory
(CWD) of FTP. Table 3 shows the number of alerts from
this attack.
4.5 Identify DoS
Flooding to Denial of Services (DoS) is the final scenario.
Within hours the attackers attempted to disrupt the nor-
mal functioning to affect the availability of the target and
succeeded. The system response delay value rose slightly
as compared to before the attack. The result was system
failures and crashes shows in Figure 7. Table 4 shows the
number of alerts from this attack.
4.6 Network Traffic Visualisation
This section presented the overall network traffic from
scanning and penetration stages shown in Figure 3 be-
low. Item (a) depicts the overall traffic of HTTP from
scanning stages and item (b) shows the dominant traf-
fic from brute force attacks. Pecentage of SSH/Telnet is
allocated 84.96% and ICMP allocated 6.41% from total
overall traffic.
This attack focused on achieving access and escalat-
ing privileges, especially penetration via brute force to
FTP and Telnet. Point (c) in Figure 3 shows some scan-
ning tools from attackers to victim and some of the tools
with open connections to the internet. We also see here
whether there are any updates of existing vulnerabilities
in their database. Meanwhile, item (d) is handshaking
traffic attackers and victims in penetration stages; the
mark indicates that the attacker launched a comprehen-
sive attack. Items (c) and (d) highlight greater traffic
flows from 10.10.10.20 and 10.10.10.15 to victim.
5 Conclusions and Future Works
We believe that penetration testing is vital in the search
for all kinds of vulnerabilities and for evaluating overall
systems. However, the small amount of vulnerability in-
formation obtained should be of particular concern. This
paper presents the vulnerabilities of Windows Server.
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Table 2: The Number of Alert from R2L stages
No Detected Alert Priority Total
1 INFO FTP Bad login 2 67625
2 WEB-PHP remote include path 1 2709
3 WEB-MISC cross site scripting attempt 1 1380
4 COMMUNITY WEB-PHP XSS attempt 1 596
5 COMMUNITY WEB-PHP XSS attempt 1 510
6 NETBIOS SMB repeated logon failure 1 453
7 NETBIOS SMB-DS repeated logon failure 1 106
8 WEB-MISC Tomcat servlet mapping cross site scripting attempt 1 19
9 (ftp telnet) Invalid FTP Command 3 18
10 WEB-CGI perl command attempt 2 13
11 FTP CWD a˜ttempt 2 2
Table 3: The Number of Alert from U2R stages
No Detected Alert Priority Total
1 WEB-MISC /etc/passwd 2 1876
2 NETBIOS SMB repeated logon failure 1 1161
3 ATTACK-RESPONSES Invalid URL 2 150
4 BACKDOOR netbus active 1 36
5 WEB-IIS CodeRed v2 root.exe access 1 19
6 BACKDOOR sensepost.exe command shell attempt 2 16
7 DOUBLE DECODING ATTACK 1 14
8 WEB-ATTACKS /etc/shadow access 2 12
9 BACKDOOR c99shell.php command request 1 4
10 WEB-MISC bad HTTP/1.1 request, Potentially worm attack 2 3
11 BACKDOOR netbus getinfo 1 1
12 FTP CWD ... 1 1
13 FTP CWD Root directory transversal attempt 3 1
Table 4: The Number of Alert from DoS stages
No Detected Alert Priority Total
1 BAD-TRAFFIC tcp port 0 traffic 3 12548
2 ICMP PING Windows 3 8334
3 ICMP PING 3 6300
4 ICMP Echo Reply 3 2125
5 ICMP Destination Unreachable Port Unreachable 3 2082
6 (snort decoder) Bad Traffic Loopback IP 3 1332
7 (snort decoder) Bad Traffic Same Src/Dst IP 3 678
8 ATTACK-RESPONSES Invalid URL 2 150
9 SNMP trap udp 2 30
10 NETBIOS SMB Trans Max Param/Count DOS attempt 3 12
11 DDOS Stacheldraht client check gag 2 7
12 COMMUNITY WEB-MISC Hasbani-WindWeb GET DoS attempt 2 4
13 DDOS mstream client to handler 2 2
14 NETBIOS SMB-DS Trans unicode Max Param DOS attempt 3 1
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Figure 6: User to Root (U2R)
Figure 7: Denial of services (DoS)
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This server presents many open invitations for attack-
ers to exploit as can be gathered from all the experiments
conducted: implanting malware, password guessing, root-
ing, web injection, creating a backdoor and DoS. It can be
concluded that the OS is vulnerable and open to exploita-
tion, and thus requires more effort to be secured. Our
conclusions are as follows: (i) there are relationships re-
sulting from the scanning and information from the CVE
vulnerability database, (ii) update policy and manage-
ment of authentication for user, (iii) it is important that
security operators assume that they will be hacked and
should better secure themselves for that reason.
Meanwhile, what this experiment indicates is that
there a large number of new attacks that could remain
hidden in the data and would not be identified using ex-
isting Snort signature. Snort cannot be used as a se-
curity platform to protect against threats; it cannot be
expected to detect all threats and trigger the necessary
response. However, Snort is adept at protocol analysis,
content matching, and packet logging. Therefore, some
future work must be conducted such as: (i) how to ex-
tract the data to analysed, (ii) how to classify the threat
and normal access, and (iii) how to visualise alert to show
details of taxonomy information from Snort.
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